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In mid-August, a hundred days passed since Nikol Pashinyan took office as Armenia’s Prime 
Minister, which is an office of key importance for the Armenian political system. Formerly 
an opposition MP, Pashinyan rose to power as a result of a bloodless revolution. He replaced 
Serzh Sargsyan, whose camp had ruled Armenia for the last two decades. The country’s do-
mestic situation is stable and its economy is growing. However, the parliamentary majority 
and significant business assets remain in the hands of the old elite, which considerably reduc-
es the present leadership’s room for manoeuvre.
Pashinyan started his work by forming a government in which key political posts were taken 
by his close collaborators. Next, he appointed new heads of central-level offices, local ad-
ministration institutions and law enforcement agencies. The prime minister also initiated the 
process of settling accounts with the old elite, although this has met with resistance on the 
part of Robert Kocharyan (Armenia’s president in 1998–2008) and his supporters. Due to the 
absence of the relevant legal instruments, the new government has failed to launch political 
and economic reforms (aside from its ostentatious fight against bribery and corruption), even 
though in his political promises Pashinyan mentioned his intention to thoroughly reconstruct 
the state, including the political scene, which is in line with what the public expects him to do. 
The prime minister’s main goal is to organise early parliamentary elections in the upcoming 
months and to win a stable majority in the new term of the National Assembly. In the present 
public mood, Pashinyan’s group could win by a landslide. However, it is not known whether 
its approval rating will remain stable in time. The plan to hold early elections is opposed by 
the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) led by Serzh Sargsyan, which holds the largest number 
of seats in parliament.
In foreign policy, Pashinyan has declared he will 
continue Armenia’s close cooperation with Rus-
sia (his first foreign trip as prime minister was 
to Sochi1), even though before the revolution 
his block demanded that Armenia should leave 
the Kremlin-controlled Eurasian Economic Un-
ion. The new government is mainly composed 
of Western-oriented politicians. In early August 
1 Aside from his trip to Nagorno Karabakh (formally 
a part of Azerbaijan) on 9 May, a day after he was elect-
ed prime minister.
2018, the prime minister stated that everyone, 
including the “Russian partners”, needs to ad-
just to the new situation in Armenia. For the 
time being, Moscow, which has been reluc-
tant to support grass-roots power shifts in the 
post-Soviet area, is cooperating with Pashin-
yan’s government. At the same time, its attitude 
towards the new Armenian leadership has been 
restrained, or at least neutral, as is evident in 
the various statements and declarations Russia 
has recently made. However, should the Kremlin 
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come to think that Russian interests in the re-
gion are threatened, it will not hesitate to use 
the political, economic and military instruments 
it has at its disposal to discipline Yerevan.
The march for power
The protests which helped the new elite rise 
to power began with Nikol Pashinyan’s march 
through Armenia. Accompanied by a group 
of collaborators, he visited successive cities to 
organise rallies against Serzh Sargsyan remain-
ing in power2. Upon reaching the capital, Pa-
shinyan went on to organise rallies and street 
marches there. Although these gathered tens 
of thousands of protesters, the authorities did 
not view them as a threat (hoping that the pro-
tests would die down on their own by 24 April, 
which is the annual mourning commemoration 
of the 1915 massacre of Armenians in the Otto-
man Empire). For this reason, as well as out of 
fear that the tragedy of 1–2 March 2008, when 
ten people were killed in riots that broke out 
when Sargsyan was elected president for his 
first term would be repeated, the government 
decided not to use force.
Pashinyan’s new tactic, that of decentralising 
the protests, turned out to be a breakthrough. 
In Yerevan and other cities, small groups of 
protesters, who were acting independently 
and were thus difficult for the police to spot 
and disperse, blocked traffic routes (streets, 
intersections, roundabouts, access routes to 
Yerevan airport and the border crossings with 
Georgia) and government buildings. By doing 
2 Pursuant to constitutional amendments made in 2015 
as a result of a referendum, Armenia switched from 
a presidential to a parliamentary system of governance. 
The 2017 parliamentary elections were held under a pro-
portional system, and the transformation ended when 
the second term of President Serzh Sargsyan expired. 
The next president, Armen Sargsyan, was elected (on 
2 March 2018) not in general elections, but by parlia-
ment, and the powers of the head of state were shift-
ed onto the prime minister. On 17 April 2018, Serzh 
Sargsyan assumed the office of prime minister, although 
he had announced that he would not run for the post 
(the nomination of another politician from the ruling 
Republican Party of Armenia would probably not have 
triggered such large-scale protests).
so, they caused a temporary disruption of the 
capital and the country as a whole. At the same 
time, Pashinyan managed to involve individuals 
in his protests who until then had been reluc-
tant to take part, including drivers (he called 
on them to honk their horns at an agreed time 
‘against Sargsyan’) and housewives (‘stand 
at a window and bang your pots and pans’). 
This triggered the impression that the entire 
country was protesting and encouraged others 
to join in. Faced with the expanding reach of 
the protests and the threat of a rift in the ruling 
camp, on 23 April 2018 Sargsyan stepped down 
as prime minister and Pashinyan became the 
candidate for this office. The National Assembly 
elected him prime minister on the second bal-
lot (on 8 May), thereby making it clear that he 
needs to take the current political line-up into 
account, regardless of his success.
The critical mass of frustration and discon-
tent within society was the main reason for 
the success of the revolution. The permanent 
state of crisis and the lack of prospects have 
forced many Armenians to leave the country, 
and the blame for this situation was put on the 
oligarchic political system associated with the 
Republican Party of Armenia and the so-called 
Karabakh clan3. In the eyes of a major portion 
of the public, Sargsyan has become the em-
bodiment of this network of connections and 
3 A group centred around politicians from Nagorno Kara-
bakh, who played a major part in the war between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan and then held top offices in 
independent Armenia (Serzh Sargsyan was the com-
mander of Karabakh’s self-defence forces, and had been 
Armenia’s defence minister for many years before he 
was elected president; the former president Robert Ko-
charyan had previously been ‘president’ of the unrec-
ognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic). Since the end of 
the 1990s, the Karabakh clan has controlled Armenia’s 
political scene and major sectors of its economy.
The critical mass of frustration and dis-
content within Armenian society was the 
main reason for the success of the revolu-
tion led by Nikol Pashinyan.
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of the country’s endemic corruption. The gen-
erational shift was also of major importance. 
The protests’ driving force were young people 
who were born in a free Armenia and do not 
remember the 1992–1994 Karabakh war. What 
curbed the previous waves of protest, includ-
ing 2015’s so-called Electromaidan triggered by 
electricity price increases, was the fear that the 
internal crisis might be exploited by Azerbai-
jan (an Azerbaijani offensive in Karabakh was 
feared). This time, neither the Karabakh issue 
nor foreign policy as a whole, including Arme-
nia’s relations with Russia, were major elements 
in the protest agenda. 
New cadres in the old line-up
When Pashinyan assumed his office, aside from 
his ongoing duties of governance he focused 
on forming a government and reshuffling the 
key posts in central and local administration by 
installing his loyal collaborators therein. These 
individuals were most frequently assigned to 
groups dominated by the old line-up. These 
groups, who were not necessarily hostile to-
wards the new leadership, were characterised 
by various connections and interdependencies 
that had formed during the rule of the Karab-
akh clan.
The Republican Party of Armenia still holds the 
largest number of seats in parliament (only 
a few MPs left the party after the revolution, 
and it still has 50 seats in the 105-seat cham-
ber), and the country’s main financial assets are 
in the hands of oligarchs linked to the previ-
ous government (the Prosperous Armenia Party 
controlled by one such oligarch, Gagik Tsaruk-
yan, has 31 seats in parliament and supported 
the revolution and Pashinyan himself; however, 
the new prime minister cannot count on this 
oligarch’s loyalty since he used to be a close as-
sociate of former president Robert Kocharyan4). 
4 Kocharyan is an oligarch himself; his assets are estimat-
ed at US$ 4 billion.
The prime minister’s own Civil Contract party 
has a mere 5 seats, and the whole Way Out 
opposition bloc which it forms a part of has 
9 seats.
Pashinyan finished the process of forming the 
government on 12 May 2018. The key political 
posts, including two out of three deputy prime 
ministers, were taken by his close collaborators 
from the Civil Contract party, Ararat Mirzoyan 
and Tigran Avinyan. Another member of Civil 
Contract, Eduard Agajanyan, was appointed 
chief of the prime minister’s staff. Many cabi-
net members are young or very young people, 
frequently with little professional experience: 
Agajanyan is 30 years old, Avinyan 29, Mkhitar 
Hayrapetyan, the minister for Armenian diaspo-
ra, is 28 (Pashinyan himself is 43). Some of his 
cabinet nominations sparked controversy: for 
example Lilit Makunts, an academic teacher and 
former English language tutor, was appointed 
minister of culture. However, the ministerial of-
fices that are of crucial importance for the state 
were assumed by experienced civil servants 
and politicians, as well as by politically non-
aligned professionals who had formerly held 
major posts in public administration. Zohrab 
Mnatsakanyan, Armenia’s representative to the 
United Nations and a former deputy minister, 
was appointed minister of foreign affairs. Davit 
Tonoyan, also a former deputy minister and 
until recently minister of emergency situations, 
was appointed minister of defence.
Over the next few weeks, Pashinyan gradually 
replaced most senior officials in central-level 
offices, local administration (city mayors and 
provincial governors), law enforcement agen-
The key political posts in Armenia’s new 
government have been taken by Pashin-
yan’s close collaborators from the Civil 
Contract party. The prime minister mainly 
appreciated their loyalty.
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cies (heads of various types of armed forces, 
the Investigative Committee), as well as the 
state TV broadcaster, by dismissing people as-
sociated with the Republican Party of Armenia 
and Serzh Sargsyan. The primary goal of these 
changes was to launch a reshuffle of the elites 
as part of the announced reform of the state. 
The other goals were to meet the expectations 
the public had voiced during the protests (the 
nominations clearly indicated that the revolu-
tion would not be limited to top government 
offices) and to prepare the ground for early 
parliamentary elections. Local officials, along-
side directors of various institutions and local 
businesspeople, traditionally form the so-called 
administrative resource (Russian: админресурс) 
which plays a major part in the pre-election pe-
riod, in that is capable of influencing the de-
cisions of voters that depend on it and is en 
masse loyal to the previous leadership. Curbing 
the importance of this resource is intended to 
guarantee equal opportunities to all the politi-
cal forces that will run in the elections.
The fact that no economic collapse happened 
over this period (the economy practically came 
to a halt during the protests) and the national 
currency, the dram, has remained stable should 
be viewed as a success for the prime minister. 
The GDP growth that has been recorded since 
the beginning of 2017 slowed down a little, 
but it still remains high: the figure for 31 Au-
gust 2018 is 7.2% (year on year)5. For the first 
time in a decade, a positive migration balance 
was recorded; between 10 May and 14 August 
2018 the number of individuals who returned 
to Armenia was higher by around 30,000 than 
5 Armenia‘s annual GDP growth rate, https://pl.trading-
economics.com/armenia/gdp-growth-annual (the GDP 
value is US$11.54 billion, or US$4219.4 per capita).
the number of those who left the country. This 
indicates that the Armenian public is optimistic 
and is pinning its hopes on the new leadership; 
it also confirms that the social situation should 
be viewed as stable6. What is also important is 
that the prime minister has managed to avoid 
being absorbed by the former political line-up, 
and has continued to consistently strengthen 
his position.
Alongside this, it cannot be said that Pashin-
yan’s team has taken over the state or assumed 
full control of it. So far, the parliament has not 
voted against Pashinyan, but it should be noted 
that no bills targeting oligarchs’ interests or the 
monopolist businesses they control have been 
submitted to parliament. Senior officials of the 
parliament` s leadership, which is also dominat-
ed by the RPA, have suggested that if this hap-
pens the deputies would act against the execu-
tive power (unless, as can be assumed, informal 
arrangements would be made to guarantee oli-
garchs a specific scope of immunity).
The fight against corruption, 
and an attempt at assessing 
the events of 2008
The actions carried out by Pashinyan and his 
government have focused on two issues: the 
fight against corruption, and the launch of the 
process of bringing to justice those guilty of the 
violent pacification of post-election demonstra-
tions in March 2008 (no-one has yet been called 
to account for the deaths of several demonstra-
tors). The individuals prosecuted include the 
family members and closest collaborators of 
top politicians from the previous government. 
Among those arrested are Vachagan Kazaryan, 
the former head of Serzh Sargsyan’s security, 
charged with multi-million embezzlement, and 
Manvel Grigoryan, the former deputy minis-
ter of defence, whose charges include steal-
ing humanitarian aid intended for the military 
6 Правительство Пашиняна преодолело рубеж в 100 
дней, “Ритм Евразии”, 21 August 2018, https://www.
ritmeurasia.org/news--2018-08-21--pravitelstvo-pashin-
jana-preodolelo-rubezh-v-100-dnej-38132
Pashinyan’s actions during the first 
months of his rule have mainly focused on 
the fight against corruption.
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(he allegedly fed animals in his private zoo with 
food children had collected for soldiers). Crim-
inal proceedings have been launched against 
Hovik Abrahamyan, Armenia’s prime minister in 
2014–16, in which he is accused of fraud and 
abuse of power. Searches and arrests have been 
carried out in companies linked to Sargsyan’s 
brothers and more distant relatives (drugs and 
weapons were found in an office belonging to 
his nephew Narek Sargsyan), as well as in circles 
associated with the oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan. 
Some oligarchs have been ‘screened’ for tax 
evasion which could form the basis for criminal 
charges. Examples include searches carried out 
in the premises occupied by oligarch and MP 
Samvel Aleksanyan (nominated by the RPA), the 
owner of the Yerevan City retail chain and an 
importer of sugar and various types of cook-
ing oil (in his social media messages Pashinyan 
has called on his supporters to avoid shopping 
at these outlets). The arrests of public figures 
may be viewed as populist moves carried out 
with a kind of haphazardness, but according to 
Pashinyan himself these measures have made 
it possible to recover major funds for the state 
budget. He also said that the law in force pre-
vents the introduction of system-wide meas-
ures, because it fails to force public officials to 
submit their asset declarations for the period in 
which they were officially not holding any pub-
lic offices7.
7 In mid-August, the prime minister announced a victory 
over corruption: “Among the top officials in the Armeni-
an government there are no and there will never be cor-
rupt individuals. I personally can guarantee this to you.” 
At the same time he said that this does not mean that 
there are no longer any officials in Armenia who take 
bribes. Пашинян объявил о победе над коррупцией 
в правительстве Армении, ‘Кавказский Узел’, 18 Au-
gust 2018, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/324328/
The practical blame for the 2008 events has 
mainly been placed on Robert Kocharyan. 
On 27 July 2018, the former president was ar-
rested and charged with organising a coup 
against the constitutional order by introduc-
ing a state of emergency in Armenia, which 
enabled the authorities to use the military to 
suppress a peaceful rally. On 13 August 2018, 
the Appellate Court released Kocharyan, refer-
ring to his immunity as a former head of state. 
Aleksandr Azaryan, the judge who issued this 
ruling, formerly worked in Kocharyan’s admin-
istration and appointed himself to preside over 
this case. Azaryan’s case illustrates the limits of 
Pashinyan’s team when they try to act within 
the boundaries of the law8.
Kocharyan’s case is pending; the General 
Prosecutor’s Office has appealed the Appel-
late Court’s ruling to the Court of Cassation. 
Meanwhile, the former president has launched 
a counter-offensive. In a long interview he 
gave to the Sputnik Armenia news agency, he 
announced his return to politics (his intention 
to run in the upcoming parliamentary elec-
tions) and warned the present leadership not 
to needle Moscow too much. He considered 
Armenia’s participation in the NATO summit 
that took place in Brussels in July 2018 to be 
one such action; the country was represented 
at the highest (prime ministerial) level, in con-
trast to the present deterioration in Russia’s re-
lations with the West. It seems that Kocharyan 
may try to attract the most pro-Russian part of 
the electorate, while at the same time convinc-
ing the Kremlin that only his group is capable 
of respecting Russia’s interests in Armenia9. 
Moscow intervened when Kocharyan was ar-
rested and when similar charges were brought 
against General Yuri Khachaturov who was lat-
8 According to Armenian columnists, judges expect in-
structions ‘from the top level’ on what ruling they are to 
issue. If no such instructions are given, traditional con-
nections and loyalty mechanisms are decisive.
9 «Это слишком опасно»: Кочарян предостерег 
власти Армении – эксклюзив, Sputnik Armenia, 
31 August 2018, https://ru.armeniasputnik.am/exclu-
sive/20180831/14159715/ehto-slishkom-opasno-kochar-
yan-predostereg-vlasti-armenia---ehksklyuziv.html
The practical blame for the massacre of 
protesters in March 2008 has mainly been 
placed on the former president Robert Ko-
charyan.
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er released on bail. In 2008, General Khacha-
turov was the commander of the Yerevan garri-
son, and at present he is the Secretary-General 
of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
(see the section on Russian-Armenian relations).
As far as the assessment of the events that hap-
pened a decade ago is concerned, Pashinyan 
has repeatedly stated that all those guilty of the 
massacre will be brought to justice; the prime 
minister’s critics argue that he is driven by the 
logic of revenge. In 2008, the present head of 
the government was a member of the cam-
paign team supporting Levon Ter-Petrosyan, 
Sargsyan’s main rival. At that time he organised 
street rallies, for which he was wanted by the 
police. He remained in hiding for some time 
and then turned himself in to the authorities. 
In 2010, he was sentenced to seven years in 
prison for organising large-scale riots, and was 
released a year and a half later when an amnes-
ty was declared.
Early elections are the only hope
During the first four months in office, Pashinyan 
has not attempted – because he could not – to 
carry out a more comprehensive reform of the 
state, although he has repeatedly stated that 
such reform is necessary. He has highlighted 
the country’s oligarchy and informal monopo-
lies, including in the import of specific types of 
goods, as barriers to Armenia’s development. 
It seems that the prime minister is aware that 
any reform requiring legislative changes would 
likely be opposed by the RPA and would meet 
with resistance on the part of the oligarchs 
linked to it. In this situation, Pashinyan’s pri-
ority is to hold early parliamentary elections 
which his party would likely win. The first poll 
conducted after the revolution, by the Voice of 
the Nation polling company between 10 July 
and 10 August 2018, showed that as many as 
64% of the surveyed individuals assessed the 
parliamentary activity of the Way Out bloc as 
positive (47% positively assessed the activity of 
the Tsarykyan bloc, and a mere 3% of the Re-
publican Party of Armenia). At the same time, 
as many as 74% declared that in the upcom-
ing elections they would vote for the Way Out 
bloc (provided that Pashinyan’s party will run 
as a part of this bloc again)10. The prime min-
ister has stated that early elections will be held 
before the first anniversary of the revolution, 
which will be in the spring of 2019.
The rally Pashinyan organised in Yeveran’s cen-
tral square to commemorate one hundred days 
of his rule can be viewed as the symbolic start 
of the electoral campaign. It was held on 17 Au-
gust 2018 and gathered around 130,000 partic-
ipants, which additionally confirms Pashinyan’s 
high approval rating. When announcing his 
plans, he said that because the constitutional 
provisions regarding the dissolution of parlia-
ment and holding early elections are associated 
with political risk (for example such elections 
can take place if Pashinyan steps down and par-
liament fails to elect a new prime minister after 
two attempts, which cannot be guaranteed), it 
would be possible to amend the constitution by 
way of a referendum to include a provision that 
would enable the National Assembly to dissolve 
itself. At the rally, Pashinyan also announced his 
plan to establish a “transitional period judici-
ary” to make the fight against corruption more 
effective, but he has not offered any details of 
10 Соцопрос: “Граждане Армении на предстоящих вне-
очередных парламентских выборах ожидают уча-
стие новых партий и считают это необходимостью”, 
Научное Общество Кавказоведов 18 August 2018, 
ht tp: //w w w.kavkazoved. info /news /2018 /08 /18 /
socopros-grazhdane-armenii-ozhidaut-uchastie-novyh-
partij.html
Early elections and a stable majority in the 
new parliament are the only factors which 
will enable Pashinyan to carry out genuine 
reform.
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this proposed solution11. (The purpose of an-
nouncing important decisions and new ideas 
during rallies and in social media is to create the 
impression that the government is transparent 
and open to criticism, as well as to emphasise 
Pashinyan’s bond with ‘the people that brought 
him to power’. It is also a way to maintain so-
ciety’s enthusiasm and draw upon the will of 
the nation as the most important source of the 
head of government’s power).
The statements the prime minister made at 
the rally on 17 August 2018 met with harsh 
criticism from the leadership of the National 
Assembly. Ara Babloyan, the President of the 
National Assembly, and Eduard Sharmazanov, 
his deputy (both of whom represent the RPA), 
issued separate statements in which they ac-
cused the prime minister of wanting to stay in 
power at all costs. They viewed his proclaimed 
manner of preparing the ground for early elec-
tions as an attempt to curb parliamentary in-
dependence (Sharmazanov even spoke against 
the plan to hold early elections, because in his 
view this could trigger renewed social unrest)12. 
11 Премьер-министр Армении Пашинян предложил 
провести конституционный референдум, News-
ru.com, 17 August 2018, https://www.newsru.com/
world/17aug2018/pashinyan.html
12 Пашинян угрожает парламенту, ставит под удар 
свободу слова – Ара Баблоян, Sputnik Armenia, 
20 August 2018, https://ru.armeniasputnik.am/poli-
tics/20180820/13984450/pashinyan-ugrozhaet-par-
lamentu-stavit-pod-udar-svobodu-slova-ara-babloy-
an.html; “Он нас обвинял в мании”: Шармазанов 
“вменил” Пашиняну стремление удержать власть 
Sputnik Armenia, 28 August 2018, https://ru.armenias-
putnik.am/politics/20180828/14115224/on-nas-obvin-
yal-v-manii-sharmazanov-vmenil-pashinyanu-stremle-
nie-uderzhat-vlast.html
On 27 August 2018, Pashinyan met Babloyan, 
and the two politicians agreed that any pro-
posed changes to the constitution should be 
subject to a broadly conceived socio-political 
debate. President Armen Sargsyan has called 
on the two sides to follow the agreements and 
resolve disputes by way of negotiation and 
dialogue.
It should be expected that if the talks regarding 
early elections are prolonged, Pashinyan may 
once again draw upon ‘the nation’s will’ and 
encourage people to take to the streets, there-
by trying to force the parliament to pass the 
bills he supports. The prime minister has not re-
vealed any detailed strategy on how to reform 
the state. So far, he has limited his statements 
(for example during the rally on 17 August 
2018) to general ideas such as reducing admin-
istration structures, introducing lower taxes, 
and eliminating the oligarchy.
Moscow’s perspective
Since the beginning of the protests in Arme-
nia, the Kremlin has followed the events with 
apprehension and carried out intensive consul-
tations with Armenia’s political forces, while 
avoiding direct involvement which could attract 
the public’s attention. The fact that the Russian 
leadership is seriously concerned is confirmed 
by the fact that the telephone conversations 
with the authorities in Yerevan both during the 
protests and after Serzh Sargsyan’s resignation 
were carried out by President Putin himself. 
The contacts at foreign ministers’ level were 
equally intensive, and Russian officials held 
talks in Russia’s embassy in Yerevan with Pash-
inyan as the leader of the protesters. According 
to unofficial information, when the protests 
were taking place, Russia’s intelligence chief 
Sergei Naryshkin travelled to Yerevan and al-
legedly held talks with Pashinyan. Although 
Armenia’s bloodless change of power had 
many of the characteristics of a so-called colour 
revolution, the Russian side maintained that the 
Although Moscow has recognised Arme-
nia’s new government, the Kremlin viewed 
the change of power that happened there 
as a threat to Russian influence and a ‘bad 
example’ for other countries of the former 
USSR.
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events unfolded within the boundaries of the 
laws in force; for example it was emphasised 
that Pashinyan had been elected prime minis-
ter by the parliament in its current line-up. This 
interpretation enabled Moscow to justify its 
recognition of Armenia’s new leadership and 
their mutual contacts. Despite this, the Kremlin 
viewed the change of power that as a result of 
protests as a threat to Russian influence, and as 
setting a ‘bad example’ for other countries of 
the former USSR.
Moscow’s first warning sign to Yerevan was 
an incident that happened on 18 July 2018, 
when during military exercises Russian soldiers 
fired multiple times in the air in a residential 
area, spreading panic among local residents. 
The Kremlin has seemed concerned by the new 
Armenian leadership’s determination to carry 
out investigations regarding corruption and 
settling accounts with the former government. 
The fact that Armenian investigators have been 
publicising their findings on the connections 
and mechanisms of corruption, which fre-
quently involve Russian capital, surely does not 
suit the Kremlin (for example, Moscow has crit-
icised the show search carried out by Armenian 
tax services at night on the premises of South 
Caucasian Railways, a 100% daughter company 
of Russian Railways). From the Kremlin’s point 
of view, it would be better if Armenia were 
corrupt and economically weak, as this would 
make it fully dependent on Russia. Moscow’s 
neutral rhetoric regarding the Armenian revo-
lution changed abruptly when Kocharyan and 
Khachaturov were arrested. Russia’s foreign 
minister Sergei Lavrov said that Moscow is con-
cerned by the situation in Armenia, and implied 
that the Armenian government had broken the 
agreements it had made with Russia. This state-
ment sparked a protest from the Armenian for-
eign ministry, but in the end the two politicians 
were released. On 31 August 2018, Putin called 
Kocharyan on the occasion of the latter’s birth-
day. The fact that this information was shared 
by Dmitri Peskov, the Kremlin’s spokesperson 
(the conversation was private and the charges 
brought against Kocharyan were allegedly not 
discussed), should be interpreted as a gesture 
of support to Armenia’s former president and 
a warning to Pashinyan and his collaborators.
It is evident that Moscow has no confidence in 
the new Armenian government. Regardless of 
the fact that as prime minister Pashinyan has 
repeatedly declared that there is no alternative 
to the strategic alliance between Armenia and 
Russia, and that the commitments Yerevan has 
undertaken will be met, Moscow remembers 
that before the revolution it was Pashinyan 
himself (then an opposition MP) who submitted 
a legislative initiative according to which Arme-
nia should leave the Eurasian Economic Union. 
Pashinyan’s government is largely composed of 
European- and Western-oriented politicians and 
activists; some of them studied at Western uni-
versities or used Western-funded grants schol-
arships offered to Armenian non-governmental 
organisations. On 3 September 2018, addressing 
students and teachers at the Moscow-based 
MGIMO University, Russia’s foreign minister Ser-
gei Lavrov implied that external actors were in-
volved in the change of power in Armenia, and 
that the situation in the country remains tense. 
Conclusions and attempts of a forecast
The possible long-term success of the Armeni-
an revolution (understood as Pashinyan remain-
ing in power for the next year, and a launch 
of the announced state reform process over 
this period) depends on two factors: the hold-
ing of early parliamentary elections (and the 
victory of the present prime minister’s party), 
and that Moscow’s attitude should remain at 
least neutral. As far as the first factor is con-
cerned, the determination Pashinyan showed 
during the revolution may bring the desired 
result (it should be assumed that if the group 
linked to the RPA agrees to early elections, 
secret concessions would have to be made in 
its favour, or security guarantees would have 
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to be issued for some politicians and/or oli-
garchs). As far as the second determining fac-
tor is concerned, it seems more likely that Mos-
cow will try to halt or at least slow down the 
process of genuine reform. Much depends on 
further direct agreements between Pashinyan 
and Putin. Since the revolution, the two poli-
ticians have met three times (most recently on 
8 September) and talked on the phone three 
times. If the Armenian prime minister manag-
es to convince Russia’s president that he will 
take Russian interests into account (this may 
include dropping all charges against Robert 
Kocharyan), the Kremlin may refrain from inter-
vening in the course of events in Armenia for 
some time. However, this does not mean that 
it will not be monitoring the situation closely. 
It should be assumed that in the long-term 
perspective Moscow will support any political 
processes and actors that could weaken Pashin-
yan’s government and compromise the idea of 
a grass-roots revolution in Armenia. In an ex-
treme scenario, in order to discipline Yerevan the 
Kremlin may reach for (or threaten to reach for) 
the Karabakh card and give the ‘green light’ to 
Azerbaijan’s limited offensive on Armenian po-
sitions (the threat that Russia might withdraw 
its informal security guarantees for the unrecog-
nised so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic has 
made Armenia refrain from signing the associ-
ation agreement it had negotiated with the EU 
at the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 
autumn 2013). This scenario would risk the dest-
abilisation of the South Caucasus as a whole.
